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Abstract 
Economists and other interested academics have committed significant time and effort to developing a set of circum-
stances under which an intelligent and circumspect form of racial profiling can serve as an effective tool in crime find-
ing–the specific objective of finding criminal activity afoot. In turn, anti-profiling advocates tend to focus on the imme-
diate efficacy of the practice, the morality of the practice, and/or the legality of the practice. However, the tenor of this 
opposition invites racial profiling proponents to develop more surgical profiling techniques to employ in crime find-
ing. In the article, I review the literature on group distinction to discern its relevance to the practice and study of racial 
profiling. I argue that the costs of racial profiling extend beyond inefficient policing and the humiliation of law-abiding 
minority pedestrians and drivers. Racial profiling is simultaneously a process of perception and articulation of relative 
human characteristics (both positive and negative); it binds and reifies the concepts of race and criminality, fixing them 
into the subconscious of the profiled, the profiler, and society at large. 
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1. Introduction 
The body of feelings which scholars, today, are so in-
clined to regard as constituting the substance of 
prejudice is actually a resultant of the way in which 
given racial groups conceive of themselves and of 
others. A basic understanding of race prejudice must 
be sought in the process by which racial groups form 
images of themselves and others. This process…is 
fundamentally a collective process. (Herbert Blumer, 
1958, p. 3) 
Contemporary analysis of racial profiling by criminolo-
gists and economists tends to focus narrowly on ques-
tions addressing the utility of profiling for crime finding 
and the presence or absence of racial animus among 
profiling officers (Engel, Calnon, & Bernard, 2002; Engle, 
2008; Knowles, Persico, & Todd, 2001; Skolnick & 
Caplovitz, 2001; Gross & Livingston, 2002; Dominitz & 
Knowles, 2006) to the exclusion of less immediate yet 
profound sociological implications. As a result of the 
limited scope of the racial profiling debate, profiling 
scholars increasingly miss the proverbial forest for the 
trees. In the forthcoming discussion, I pivot from the is-
sue of racial profiling efficacy to that of the social con-
struction of race in the context of racial profiling. I ar-
gue that when police engage in racial profiling race and 
criminality take shape as co-constituted social con-
structs that inform a sense of racial hierarchy.  
In the context of police work, the racial profile 
should be understood as distinct from a witness de-
scription. A profile, for the purposes of the my analysis, 
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is a police conception of a hypothesized, criminally ac-
tive person while a witness description (which may in-
clude race or ethnicity in combination with other de-
scriptors) is witness generated and used to capture 
suspects only after a criminal allegation has been re-
ported. Thus, police receive the witness description 
from a first-hand observer of a criminal action, where-
as the profile is constructed and deployed by the police 
officer and/or the police institution based on the antic-
ipated social location of a crime for which there is no 
witness or direct evidence. Unlike the witness descrip-
tion, which is offered by a witness to a crime that has 
allegedly transpired, police employ the racial profile 
without direct knowledge of criminal activity afoot. The 
profile informs the police officer’s expectation of pre-
cisely where to find criminal activity. In developing the 
profile, the profiler anticipates the characteristics of 
the perpetrator, who is an abstraction rather than a 
real person.  
My project in this paper is to use sociological inves-
tigations into the social construction of social groups—
both subordinate and superordinate—to illuminate the 
co-construction of race and criminality through the tac-
tic of racial profiling. By drawing theories regarding 
group formation and group distinction into a racial pro-
filing literature dominated by quantitative assessment, I 
hope to initiate and encourage an analysis of the impact 
of racial profiling that extends beyond the objective ef-
fectiveness of the practice in locating criminal activity 
afoot. I look instead to the potential for racial profiling to 
instill in the minds of the profiler, the profiled, and socie-
ty at large the essential characteristics of those individu-
als affiliated with the targeted racial category.  
The remainder of the paper is broken into three 
sections. In Section 2, I present a brief overview of the 
literature assessing the utility of racial profiling via sta-
tistical analysis. While offering an informative debate 
on the immediate effectiveness of racial profiling, 
quantitative studies have failed to consider many of 
the sociological costs of the practice. I review sociolog-
ical studies regarding the social production of social 
groups and social group boundaries in Section 3 as part 
of an effort to clearly articulate these costs. In Section 
4, I delineate the process by which racial profiling es-
tablishes racial characteristics in a three-part schemat-
ic. I conclude that racial profiling by police fortifies and 
conflates racial and criminal group classifications, and 
that this negative distinction is in effect a state-
sponsored project in collective definition.  
2. The Efficacy Question 
Criminal law scholars in conjunction with a number of 
economists have turned to the question of the efficacy 
of racial profiling, specifically, the extent to which the 
targeting of members of a racial group reduces criminal 
activity (Knowles et al., 2001; Hernández-Murillo & 
Knowles, 2004; Harcourt, 2004; Harcourt, 2006; Bo-
rooah, 2001). Many of the scholars writing in this school 
argue that police may engage in racial profiling absent 
racial animus and, likewise, use racial profiling as a be-
nign and effective tool for identifying criminal activity 
(Engle et al., 2002). The logic of such argumentation 
holds that racial profiling stemming from racial animus 
should show a criminal activity “hit rate” (i.e., a posi-
tive finding of criminal conduct per stop/investigation) 
among the profiled group that is lower than that of in-
dividuals outside the profiled group. If the hit rate of 
the targeted racial group is equal to or greater than 
that of the rest of the population despite heightened 
police scrutiny, the profiling practice is thought to be 
based on rational grounds rather than irrational racial 
bias. This latter outcome, in theory, affirms the efficacy 
of the practice and serves as prima facie evidence that 
the police use race in a benign fashion rather than in a 
manner intended to harm or subjugate the profiled ra-
cial group (Harcourt, 2004, p. 1293).  
Scholars have critiqued statistical models con-
structed to test for “benign” racial profiling, primarily 
by evaluating their effectiveness in revealing criminal 
activity and criminal actors. For instance, alternative 
statistical analyses exploring the “elasticity” of racial 
profiling show that racial profiling efficacy has less of a 
deterrent effect on African-Americans than on other 
groups given the challenges African-Americans face in 
finding alternative income streams. Associated findings 
suggest that racial profiling may ultimately increase the 
total amount of criminal activity in a given setting given 
that non-profiled groups are likely to recognize when 
police attention is narrowly focused elsewhere (Har-
court, 2004). 
A few academic treatments of racial profiling have 
challenged the practice from a more sociological point 
of view, conveying the racializing elements inherent to 
the act as an important outcome to be considered. 
UCLA Law Professor Devon Carbado begins his critique 
of Supreme Court decisions regarding the practice of 
racial profiling with an account of the first few years af-
ter his immigration to the United States (Carbado, 
2002). Carbado, a British national, found himself sub-
ject to racial profiling soon after he arrived in the U.S., 
and while he initially expressed anger during each inci-
dent of perceived police abuse, he eventually conclud-
ed that his claims of racial bias only served to compli-
cate already precarious police encounters. Carbado 
writes that he soon adopted the role of the passive Af-
rican American male, intent on letting each momentary 
police intrusion end without further incident. These 
experiences collectively served as a “naturalization 
ceremony within which our submission to authority re-
flected and reproduced black racial subjectivity” (Car-
bado, 2002, p. 957). Cabado states plainly, “We were 
growing into our American profile” (p. 958). 
I wish to link Carbado’s anecdotal illustration of the 
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impact of racial profiling on the transformation of his 
own subjectivity to sociological knowledge regarding 
the utility of race in establishing group distinction, 
group hierarchy and collective subjectivity in a given 
social setting. This orientation toward the study of ra-
cial profiling shifts the outcome analysis from “crime 
finding” to the less immediate issue of the dissemina-
tion of social meaning by way of a specific form of 
state-sponsored group distinction. When applied to the 
subject of racial profiling, the sociological study of the 
production of group distinction reveals that role-play in 
the profiling moment produces a specific understand-
ing of social hierarchy for the profiled, and the profiler. 
Through similar scripts played out countless times each 
day, citizens and police alike come to naturalize racial 
categories and racial role-play based on subordinate 
and superordinate racial group status.  
3. The Dynamic Process of Group Distinction  
Despite its role as a pervasive and daunting force in 
American society, “race” exists largely as a social con-
struct and as a product of public definition (Omi & 
Winant, 1994; Brubaker, 2004; Wacquant, 2004; Lopez, 
2006; Davis, 2010). That is to say that race does not ex-
ist outside of collective understanding of the concept 
and acquiescence to its predetermined logics. Scholars 
of racial group formation and racial prejudice have 
thoroughly examined and theorized the social process 
of creating artificial, bounded categories to which indi-
viduals are assigned (Hacking, 1996). Though categori-
zation serves a natural and necessary way of under-
standing the social world, the process itself establishes 
distinctions that can immediately transform collective 
perception of social reality (Hacking, 1996). The cate-
gorized subject often arises within and through the dy-
namic process of categorization.  
The claim of dynamic nominalism is not that there 
was a kind of person who became increasingly to be 
recognized by bureaucrats or by students of human 
nature but rather that a kind of person came into 
being at the same time as the kind itself was being 
invented. In some cases, that is, classifications and 
our classes conspire to emerge hand in hand, each 
egging on the other (p. 228). 
The institutionalization of categories and labels often 
impacts the extent to which a social group is assigned 
meaning within the public consciousness. The institu-
tional mobilization of social group categories through 
institutional practices such as racial profiling set a path 
for new societal perspectives on the social world and 
thus new social realities. Institutional classifications 
shape public understandings. 
Scholars have identified the “dramatization of evil” 
in the context of the criminal processing of the crimi-
nally accused within similar conceptual parameters 
(Tannenbaum, 1957). For instance, the moment when 
a young person is first placed in contact with the crimi-
nal justice system serves as a pivotal point in the 
youth’s relationship with the state and the community 
and, likewise, in the development of her perception of 
self. To the extent that the criminal act results in the 
state’s application of a criminal identity, the youth—
now categorized as “deviant” and “defendant”—falls 
into a binary with the community (Tannenbaum, 1957). 
If, alternatively, the community frames the youth’s 
contact with the judicial system in cooperative terms, 
all invested parties might be more likely to continue to 
view that child as a part of (rather than alien to) the 
community. In the application of criminal labels, the 
act rather than the child’s life circumstance or constitu-
tion comes to represent the child to the state forum 
and to society. The conceptualization of the child as 
criminal—a “dramatization of evil” in the institutional 
context of criminal procedure—is understood to have a 
powerful normative effect. It shapes a new subjectivity 
for the child in which the child plays the role of a devi-
ant suffering from a dysfunctional disposition rather 
than the role of a child having committed a single devi-
ant act.  
The expanded role of police in school discipline is 
another telling example of the impact of dramatization. 
As school administrators employ full time on-site police 
forces, the school as an institution often “dramatizes” 
and criminalizes behavior that has been found in every 
schoolyard for centuries past (Fine et al., 2003). This is 
not to discount the destructive impact incidents of vio-
lence can have on a school community. It is instead to 
highlight how particular penal responses—locked exits, 
on-site police, and routine criminal charging—establish 
penal norms and penal identities in the minds of stu-
dent, teacher, and administrator alike (Fine et al., 
2003). These norms are not benign. They inform group 
distinctions by way of conceptualization—here, be-
tween bad behavior in school and criminal deviance. If 
a child recognizes that she is being regulated in a man-
ner similar to a prison, she accepts that stage and 
script and is thus to some degree conditioned to play 
the role appropriate for the setting. 
Goffman’s idea of “stigma symbols” provides an-
other frame by which to conceptualize the manner in 
which social cues come to characterize social groups 
(Goffman, 1963). Through symbols, social information 
is conveyed to the social actors in a given setting. Chil-
dren attending school under lock and key in the name 
of their own security are not per se criminals, but de-
velop criminal perspectives of themselves by way of 
the signals embedded in the school setting (Goffman, 
1963, p. 46). “The normal and the stigmatized are not 
persons but rather perspectives. These are generated 
in social situations during mixed contacts by virtue of 
the unrealized norms that are likely to play upon the 
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encounter” (1963, p. 138).  
Race theorists have similarly argued race conceptu-
alization and the cultivation of racial stigma to be a 
“fundamentally collective process” (Blumer, 1958). In 
this line of analysis, racial prejudice stems from the 
identification one’s own racial group relative to anoth-
er, and requires a clear and functional understanding 
of how each group is defined to the exclusion of the 
other. Thus, in order to conceive of two races, both 
must be defined in terms of particular group character-
istics. Racial prejudice cannot exist unless the social 
position and character of each group is apparent to the 
social actor. Moreover, such prejudice requires racial 
corollaries, namely a specific conceptualization of a 
subjugated and dominant group (Blumer, 1958). In tak-
ing the constitution of racial groups for granted rather 
than accounting for their dynamic social production, 
social actors and institutions ignore the tacit ways in 
which specific conceptualizations of race inform human 
thought, perception, action, and speech and likewise 
group division in social life. Through these diverse so-
cial processes our minds structure and come to perceive 
and act upon the social world (Brubaker, Loveman, & 
Stamatov, 2004). 
People around the world trade in “common sense” 
(yet variable) racial categories based on the notion that 
race and ethnicity exist as fixed and essential qualities 
(Brubaker, 2002). The institutionalization of race has 
been a significant subject of sociological study in part 
because it sheds light on the classification processes 
that can establish racial distinction (2002, p. 167). Criti-
cal analysis of such processes can pinpoint fundamental 
elements of racial conflict and perception of racial threat.  
This [analytical orientation] means thinking of eth-
nicity, race, and nation not in terms of substantial 
groups or entities but in terms of practical catego-
ries, cultural idioms, cognitive schemas, discursive 
frames, organizational routines, institutional forms, 
political projects, and contingent events. It means 
thinking of ethnicization, racialization, and national-
ization, as political, social, cultural, and psychologi-
cal processes. And it means taking as a basic analyt-
ical category not ‘the group’ as an entity but 
groupness as a contextually fluctuating conceptual 
variable. (p. 167)  
Symbolic power, which manifests in various processes 
of group distinction, can serve as an essential cog in 
the process of collective understanding (Bourdieu, 
1973). Through symbols, society coalesces to create 
shared meaning. Symbols are at the core of the process 
of public definition and the achievement of shared 
meaning, as well as the vehicle by which meaning is 
imposed on the public; they are fundamental to the re-
ification of the social order. But more than organizing a 
collective reality, the symbolism underlying human 
taxonomy holds the potential to commit “symbolic vio-
lence” in its facilitation of group domination. The term 
“racial stereotype,” for instance, is central to this dis-
cussion, but its common understanding fails to capture 
the dynamic, collective, and variable quality of racial 
group distinction. The stereotype is a basic conceptual-
ization of the symbolic power that facilitates the pro-
duction and dissemination of racial distinction (Bour-
dieu, 1973, p. 169). Rather than being the product of 
arbitrary mental processes, racial stereotypes are trig-
gered by symbols and are borne of symbolic power. 
They are thought to arise from natural inclinations, but 
survive by way of systems of classification and corre-
sponding mental structures that adhere to a larger and 
implicit race orthodoxy (Bourdieu, 1973).  
In shaping social groups and establishing group 
boundaries, we use established categories as readily 
accessible packets of information that help us compre-
hend the social world. Micro, person-to-person interac-
tions inform racial categories and racial distinctions, as 
do the meso-level actions of institutions, particularly 
public institutions, which are recognized as represent-
ing affiliated publics and as operating in accordance 
with the public will. To understand both how racial 
meaning is produced and how it is digested in a given 
social moment, one must critically assess the role of 
the state in fostering and reifying racial distinction. This 
analytical orientation has yet to be applied to the case 
of racial profiling by police.  
4. Racial Profiling and Racial Group Distinction 
To characterize another racial group is, by opposi-
tion, to define one’s own group. This is equivalent 
to placing the two groups in relation to each other, 
or defining their positions vis-a-vis each other. It is 
this sense of social position emerging from this col-
lective process of characterization which provides 
the basis for prejudice. (Herbert Blumer, 1958, p. 4) 
The practice of racial profiling begins with a process of 
racial distinction that takes place in the mind of the po-
lice officer or in the formulation of policing policy. The 
profiling act itself informs the collective definition of 
race by articulating racial group characteristics and, by 
logical extension, racial group relations and relative ra-
cial group standing.  
4.1. Constructing Race in Criminal Justice 
In the following discussion I look to establish a basic 
framework for the manner in which racial profiling pol-
icy and practice convey group distinction to various 
segments of society within the distinct levels of formu-
lation and execution. In the three hypothesized “thea-
ters” of racial profiling presented in the framework, 
specific segments of society witness or participate in 
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racial profiling, or in some way come to understand ra-
cial profiling as a state-sponsored security project. As a 
result, criminal characteristics attach to the targeted 
racial classification. The three theaters are not mutual-
ly exclusive as one or all may manifest in the racial pro-
filing moment.  
Theater I: Lone Officer Construction of Racial Mean-
ing: The individual officer makes an independent and 
autonomous decision to profile a targeted racial group 
member on the street in the context of a cursory inves-
tigation. Consider the following example. Patrol offic-
ers in a squad car stop a group of African-American 
men driving late in the evening in a predominantly 
white neighborhood and ask for identification and in-
quire as to their ultimate destination. The encounter 
escalates to the point where the officers place the men 
in handcuffs and sit them on the curb while conducting 
a search of the vehicle. In this scenario, an association 
between criminal propensity and African-American racial 
classification is conveyed to the profiling officer, the pro-
filed subject, and witnesses to the profiling event. 
Theater II: Institutional Construction of Racial 
Meaning—Internal: The police institution adopts an in-
ternal policy naming race as one of a litany of indicia of 
criminality. Race is defined to all members of the police 
institution and all other employees privy to the policy. 
The profiling act by the lone officer in Theater I is not 
predicated on racial profiling policy, as in Theater II. 
However, if the police institution formally establishes 
that officers should associate a racial classification with 
criminal propensity, the conceptual association be-
comes ingrained within the police institution. Institu-
tional construction of racial meaning in Theater II facili-
tates, endorses, and encourages profiling by officers in 
the field and informs the quality of their engagement 
with those associated with the targeted racial category. 
In Theater II, the conflation of race and criminality is no 
longer limited to the autonomous mind of an individual 
officer. The conflation is instead explicit within the in-
stitution and legitimated by the institutional authority. 
In Theater II, profiling loses its secretive character and 
some of its accompanying stigma, and extends the co-
construction of race and criminality from the calcula-
tion of a single individual in a private sphere to the in-
stitutional consciousness encompassing the police col-
lective.  
Theater III: Institutional Construction of Racial 
Meaning—External: The judicial, legislative, or execu-
tive branch of the local, state, or federal government 
publicly endorses profiling. Here, the public institution 
endorsing racial profiling validates the practice in the 
“collective consciousness.” Racial profiling appears to 
be the product of careful deliberation by elected lead-
ers and/or ostensibly democratic institutions. The con-
flation of racial classifications and criminal propensity 
finds public acceptance. For the sake of pragmatism, 
deliberations about public safety include the contem-
plation of race, perhaps even regretfully. In advancing 
from Theater I to Theater II, the construction of racial 
meaning advances from the individual to the institu-
tional, from the implicit to the explicit, from a function 
of culture to an element of structure.1 In the move 
from Theater II to Theater III, the construction of racial 
meaning comes to serve as an element of societal or 
public knowledge, informing the collective understand-
ing of race rather than merely the institutional under-
standing.  
4.2. Racial Meaning in Washington, D.C. 
An incident in Washington, D.C., in 2006 helps to illus-
trate the relationship between the three theaters of ra-
cial profiling and racial group distinction. After a high-
profile murder in the city’s wealthy and largely white 
Georgetown area, Andy Solberg, a white police com-
mander for the city district that included Georgetown, 
addressed a meeting of concerned local residents at a 
neighborhood church. In reference to the homicide, Sol-
berg offered the group what he likely understood to be 
common-sense tips on neighborhood safety. 
I would think that at 2 o'clock in the morning on the 
streets of Georgetown, a group of three people, 
one of whom is 15 years old, one of whom is a bald 
chunky fat guy, are going to stand out…They were 
black. This is not a racial thing to say that black 
people are unusual in Georgetown. This is a fact of 
life (The Washington Times, 2006). 
When Solberg’s comments became a top local news 
story, Charles Ramsey, the city’s African-American po-
lice chief, initially offered public support for the 19-
year department veteran, saying that Solberg was a 
“very, very good guy” and had done great work in the 
area of city in which he served as commander (Klein, 
2006). An African-American store owner in Georgetown 
interviewed by The Washington Post seemed startled 
at the controversy saying, “How come people don’t 
know that? These people live in a box? It is highly, high-
ly unusual to see three young black males roaming 
around up there in the residential neighborhoods.” 
Charles Lawrence, an African-American, a former D.C. 
School Board Council member and a friend of Solberg 
                                                          
1 An example can be found in an FBI policy proposed by the 
Justice Department (DOJ) in 2008. In July of 2008, the Associ-
ated Press reported that DOJ had formulated a policy that 
would allow the FBI to investigate Americans absent a report 
of wrongdoing. Under the policy, the FBI would construct a 
“terrorist profile” that included race and ethnicity, and use 
data mining techniques to formulate a list of subjects to be 
investigated. Attorney General Mukasey denied that Ameri-
cans would be investigated solely because of race, but left 
the door open to race and ethnicity being used to construct a 
basis of suspicion (Jordan, 2008).  
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said that he regretted the public criticism. In describing 
the commander he pointed out that Solberg sent his 
children to a public school that was 95% African-
American and coached a local soccer team that was 
nearly entirely African-American. “What we really need 
is more white folks who are not going to run and hide 
but are committed to living here like Andy. I don’t 
know any white person in the city who is less afraid of 
or more fair about race” (Fisher, 2006). Ramsey rein-
stated Solberg to his original position two weeks after 
assigning him to another district (Klein, 2006).  
This account of racial profiling in Washington, D.C. 
(a city fondly referred to in some circles as “Chocolate 
City”) seems remarkable in a number of other respects. 
First, and most relevant to the “theaters” framework, it 
demonstrates the external pressure police officials face 
in advancing racial profiling from Theaters I and II to 
Theater III. The narrative suggests that Commander 
Solberg, in advising Georgetown residents to racially 
profile, had relayed a tactic considered unexceptional 
in police circles. Solberg, acting in an advisory role to 
the Georgetown neighborhood community, prescribed 
racial profiling, and implicitly suggested that racial pro-
filing among police was standard practice and “com-
mon sense.” For the presumably largely white audience 
in attendance, he advised a particular understanding of 
African-American presence in Georgetown. Though the 
media reporting of Solberg’s statement included back-
lash over the comments, the ensuing dialogue was a 
sincere public exploration of the extent to which race 
and criminality could legitimately be associated. Local 
media coverage of the incident does not show a single 
police official denouncing Solberg’s statements or even 
disagreeing with his proposition to the Georgetown 
neighborhood group. In fact, the media record shows 
sparse dissent from Solberg’s statements relative to 
the number of affirmations. Individual and internal bu-
reaucratic assessments of the link between concep-
tions of race and criminality were ultimately dissemi-
nated to public forums and local and national media 
without direct challenge from the police institution. 
Racial profiling conveys an implicit racial logic when 
it is an ad hoc, individual practice or insulated within 
the police institution. However, when adopted or in-
ferred as institutional policy and publicized as either 
sound policy or a sensible neighborhood safety precau-
tion, the societal impact of racial profiling grows sub-
stantially. Explicit approval of racial profiling policy by 
police, national security institutions, city councils, state 
legislatures, or Congress, publicly defines the profiled 
to the collective. It openly casts racial characteristics as 
fixed in a social context that is understood to be demo-
cratic and subject to the will of the people. At which 
point, the covert quality of racial profiling practice by 
an individual or within a closed institutional system 
yields to an advertised notion of criminality borne out 
of democratic deliberations rather than hidden hunch-
es. Racial profiling in the theater of the public amounts 
to more than a moment of individual shame for target-
ed racial group members. It functions more broadly as 
a constructive enterprise that builds collective under-
standing of both race and criminality and reinforces 
this understanding through subsequent, innumerable 
police-public contacts.  
4.3. Race, Group Distinction, and Social Closure  
Sociologists have insisted that the process of racial dis-
tinction not be studied in a vacuum, but instead as-
sessed as part of larger system of group boundary con-
struction and maintenance (i.e., in relation to its co-
dependence with social classifications such as class and 
criminal record) (Schwartzmann, 2007). Mara Loveman 
writes that, “[s]uch a framework could permit identifi-
cation of the patterns of relations between particular 
social processes and particular structural conditions 
that trigger certain boundary dynamics; consequently, 
it could improve social scientific understanding, explana-
tion, and theorization” (Loveman, 1997) (my empha-
sis).  
The investigation of interdependent forms of social 
closure is significant to the development of a compre-
hensive understanding of the social consequences of 
racial profiling. The embrace of racial profiling func-
tions as a form of social closure as it marks, stigmatiz-
es, and isolates by disseminating theories of racial 
group distinction. The moment police choose to profile 
a racial group or a single group member, the character-
istic of criminality is freshly assigned to the group in at 
least one of the three profiling theaters, typecasting 
the group, and calling for the anticipation of criminal 
conduct by other group members. 
Police conflation of racial and criminal classification 
in the project of racial profiling ultimately aligns with a 
larger structural system of group subjugation. As the 
“black” racial classification becomes a proxy for crimi-
nality and dangerousness and state actors orient penal 
infrastructure to this predetermined racial target, the 
group draws closer to civic death (Wacquant, 2005). In 
the U.S., offenders are increasingly barred from college 
loans, welfare benefits, public housing, and the right to 
vote (Wacquant, 2005). Moreover, the ex-felon is unlike-
ly to be hired as an employee in the public or private 
sector, or to secure funds for job training. The pattern of 
physical and symbolic exclusion produced through racial 
profiling policy and practice aligns with these collective 
penal effects to shape a robust racial-meaning making 
system that undergirds racial hierarchy.  
5. Conclusion 
Race and criminality are malleable social constructs 
subject to public definition. The meaning of the terms 
takes shape through rhetoric, policy, and implicit and 
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explicit symbolism and role-play. A narrow focus on 
questions of racial profiling’s utility in crime finding 
renders innocuous its important contributions to racial 
meaning. The racial profiling endeavor, as practice and 
policy, signals to society the loci of criminality. To find 
criminal activity, look there. To identify criminal pro-
pensity, look here. In contrast to the description given 
by a witness reporting a crime, racial profiling conveys 
instructions on how to anticipate crime. It primes the 
public to expect criminal acts from a specific category 
of persons, and in the process informs and exacerbates 
a form of social marginalization that has burdened the 
U.S. since its very inception. 
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